Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria when firms avoid turning customers away
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Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria when firms avoid turning customers away by Huw Dixon

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Published by University of Essex, Dept. of Economics in [Colchester] .
Written in English


Book details:

Edition Notes

Statementby Huw Dixon.
SeriesDiscussion paper series / University of Essex, Department of Economics -- no.341
ID Numbers
Open LibraryOL17287725M

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Bertrand-Edgeworth Equilibria when Firms Avoid Turning Customers Away. Huw Dixon () Journal of Industrial Economics, , vol. 39, issue 2, Abstract: This paper provides a simple solution to the problem of nonexistence of pure-strategy equilibria in Bertrand-Edgeworth models with strictly convex costs. The voluntary-trading constraint Cited by: Whilst this can ensure the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, it comes at the cost of generating multiple equilibria. However, as shown by Huw Dixon, if the cost of turning customers away is sufficiently small, then any pure-strategy equilibria that exist will be close to the competitive equilibrium. Dixon, H., , Approximate Bertrand equilibria in a replicated industry, Review of Economic Stud Dixon, H., , Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria when firms avoid turning customers away, Journal of Industrial Econom In a couple of papers, Dixon, , Dixon, also demonstrates the existence of pure strategy equilibria in Bertrand–Edgeworth models of price competition. However, while Dixon () examines epsilon-Nash rather than exact Nash equilibria, Dixon () is driven by an assumption on the firm side (that they avoid turning customers away), rather than on by: 3.

Firms have to meet all demand at the price they set as proposed by Krishnendu Ghosh Dastidar or pay some cost for turning away customers. Whilst this can ensure the existence of a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, it comes at the cost of generating multiple equilibria. Bertrand Equilibria with Entry: Limit Results. When Firms Avoid Turning Customers Away. of nonexistence of pure-strategy equilibria in Bertrand-Edgeworth models with strictly convex costs. Rationing rules and Bertrand–Edgeworth equilibria in large markets. Economics Lett – The middle section of the book, an in-depth treatment of classic static models, provides Author: Prabal Roy Chowdhury. Bertrand-Edgeworth Competition Under Uncertainty Armin Hartmanny Ma Abstract This paper considers a Bertrand Edgeworth Duopoly where rivals cost are private information. It brings together the full information Bertrand Edge-worth model of Kovenock-Deneckere and the Bertrand under uncertainty model of Size: KB.

"Bertrand-Edgeworth Equilibria when Firms Avoid Turning Customers Away," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 39(2), pages , December. Neil Bjorksten, " Voluntary Import Expansions and Voluntary Export Restraints in an Oligopoly Model with Capacity Constraints," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Cited by: 1. BERTRAND-EDGEWORTH EQUILIBRIA WHEN FIRMS AVOID TURNING CUSTOMERS AWAY* Huw DIXON This paper provides a simple solution to the problem of non-existence of pure-strategy equilibria in Bertrand-Edgeworth models with strictly convex costs. The voluntary-trading constraint in . Bertrand-Edgeworth equilibria when firms avoid turning customers away. Journal of Industrial Economics 39 (2), pp. Dixon, Huw David Comparing Cournot and Bertrand in a Homogeneous Product Market those market sharing rules which have the property of including the competitive equilibrium in the set of Bertrand equilibria (for example, the “capacity sharing” rule). J. DixonBertrand–Edgeworth equilibria when firms avoid turning customers away. J. Indu. Econ., 39 Cited by: